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Abstract
Consensus halving refers to the problem of dividing a resource into two parts so that
every agent values both parts equally. Prior work has shown that when the resource is
represented by an interval, a consensus halving with at most n cuts always exists, but is
hard to compute even for agents with simple valuation functions. In this paper, we study
consensus halving in a natural setting where the resource consists of a set of items without a
linear ordering. When agents have additive utilities, we present a polynomial-time algorithm
that computes a consensus halving with at most n cuts, and show that n cuts are almost
surely necessary when the agents’ utilities are drawn from probabilistic distributions. On
the other hand, we show that for a simple class of monotonic utilities, the problem already
becomes PPAD-hard. Furthermore, we compare and contrast consensus halving with the
more general problem of consensus k-splitting, where we wish to divide the resource into
k parts in possibly unequal ratios, and provide some consequences of our results on the
problem of computing small agreeable sets.
1 Introduction
Given a set of resources, how can we divide it between two families in such a way that every
member of both families believes that the two resulting parts have the same value? This is an
important problem in resource allocation and has been addressed several times under different
names [Neyman, 1946; Hobby and Rice, 1965; Alon, 1987], with consensus halving being the
name by which it is best known today [Simmons and Su, 2003].
In prior studies of consensus halving, the resource is represented by an interval, and the goal
is to find an equal division into two parts that makes a small number of cuts in the interval.1
Using the Borsuk-Ulam theorem from topology, Simmons and Su [2003] established that for any
continuous preferences of the n agents involved, there is always a consensus halving that uses no
more than n cuts—this also matches the smallest number of cuts in the worst case. In addition,
the same authors developed an algorithm that computes an ε-approximate solution for any given
ε > 0, meaning that the values of the two parts differ by at most ε for every agent. Although
the algorithm is more efficient than a brute-force approach, its running time is exponential in
the parameters of the problem. This is in fact not a coincidence: Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg
[2018] recently showed that ε-approximate consensus halving is PPA-complete, implying that
the problem is unlikely to admit a polynomial-time algorithm. Filos-Ratsikas et al. [2020a]
strengthened this result by proving that the problem remains hard even when the agents have
1Simmons and Su [2003] assume that the resource is a two- or three-dimensional object but only consider cuts
by parallel planes; their model is therefore equivalent to that of a one-dimensional object.
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simple valuations over the interval. In particular, the PPA-completeness result holds for agents
with “two-block uniform” valuations, i.e., valuation functions that are piecewise uniform over
the interval and assign non-zero value to at most two separate pieces.
While these hardness results stand in contrast to the positive existence result, they rely
crucially on the resource being in the form of an interval. Most practical division problems do
not fall under this assumption, including when we divide assets such as houses, cars, stocks,
business ownership, or facility usage. When each item is homogeneous, a consensus halving can
be easily obtained by splitting every item in half. However, since splitting individual assets
typically involves an overhead, for example in managing a joint business or sharing the use of
a house, we want to achieve a consensus halving while splitting only a small number of assets.
Fortunately, a consensus halving that splits at most n items is guaranteed to exist regardless of
the number of items—this can be seen by arranging the items on a line in arbitrary order and
applying the aforementioned existence theorem of Simmons and Su [2003]. The bound n is also
tight: if each agent only values a single item and the n valued items are distinct, all of them
clearly need to be split. Nevertheless, given that the items do not inherently lie on a line, the
hardness results from previous work do not carry over. Could it be that computing a consensus
halving efficiently is possible when the resource consists of a set of items?
1.1 Overview of Results
We assume throughout the paper that the resource is composed of m items. Each item is
homogeneous, so the utility of an agent for a (possibly fractional) set of items depends only on
the fractions of the m items in that set. For this overview we focus on the more interesting case
where n ≤ m, but all of our results can be extended to arbitrary n and m.
We begin in Section 2 by considering agents with additive utilities, i.e., the utility of each
agent is additive across items and linear in the fraction of each item. Under this assumption,
we present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a consensus halving with at most n cuts
by finding a vertex of the polytope defined by the relevant constraints. This positive result
stands in stark contrast with the PPA-hardness when the items lie on a line, which we obtain
by discretizing an analogous hardness result of Filos-Ratsikas et al. [2020a]. We then show
that improving the number of cuts beyond n is difficult: even computing a consensus halving
that uses at most n − 1 cuts more than the minimum possible for a given instance is NP-
hard. Nevertheless, we establish that instances admitting a solution with fewer than n cuts are
rare. In particular, if the agents’ utilities for items are drawn independently from non-atomic
distributions, it is almost surely the case that every consensus halving requires no fewer than n
cuts.
Next, in Section 3, we address the broader class of monotonic utilities, wherein an agent’s
utility for a set does not decrease when any fraction of an item is added to the set. For
such utilities, we show that the problem of computing a consensus halving with at most n
cuts becomes PPAD-hard, thereby providing strong evidence of its computational hardness.2
Perhaps surprisingly, this hardness result holds even for the class of utility functions that we
call “symmetric-threshold utilities”, which are very close to being additive. Indeed, such utility
functions are additive across items; for each item, having a sufficiently small fraction of the item
is the same as not having the item at all, having a sufficiently large fraction of it is the same
as having the whole item, and the utility increases linearly in between. On the other hand,
we present a number of positive results for monotonic utilities when the number of agents is
constant in Appendix A.
In Section 4, we provide some implications of our results on the “agreeable sets” problem
2We refer to [Roughgarden, 2016, Chapter 20] for a discussion of the complexity class PPAD.
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studied by Manurangsi and Suksompong [2019]. A set is said to be agreeable to an agent if the
agent likes it at least as much as the complement set. Manurangsi and Suksompong proved that
a set of size at most
⌊
m+n
2
⌋
that is agreeable to all agents always exists, and this bound is tight.
They then gave polynomial-time algorithms that compute an agreeable set matching the tight
bound for two and three agents. We significantly generalize this result by exhibiting efficient
algorithms for any number of agents with additive utilities, as well as any constant number of
agents with monotonic utilities. In addition, we present a short alternative proof for the bound⌊
m+n
2
⌋
via consensus halving.
Finally, in Section 5, we study the more general problem of consensus k-splitting for agents
with additive utilities. Our aim in this problem is to split the items into k parts so that all
agents agree that the parts are split according to some given ratios α1, . . . , αk; consensus halving
corresponds to the special case where k = 2 and α1 = α2 = 1/2. Unlike for consensus halving,
however, in consensus k-splitting we may want to cut the same item more than once when k > 2,
so we cannot assume without loss of generality that the number of cuts is equal to the number
of items cut. For any k and any ratios α1, . . . , αk, we show that there exists an instance in
which cutting (k− 1)n items is necessary. On the other hand, a generalization of our consensus
halving algorithm from Section 2 computes a consensus k-splitting with at most (k − 1)n cuts
in polynomial time, thereby implying that the bound (k − 1)n is tight for both benchmarks.
We also illustrate further differences between consensus k-splitting and consensus halving, both
with respect to item ordering and from the probabilistic perspective.
1.2 Related Work
Consensus halving falls under the broad area of fair division, which studies how to allocate
resources among interested agents in a fair manner [Brams and Taylor, 1996, 1999; Moulin,
2003]. Common fairness notions include envy-freeness—no agent envies another agent in view
of the bundles they receive—and equitability—all agents have the same utility for their own
bundle. The fair division literature typically assumes that each recipient of a bundle is either
a single agent or a group of agents represented by a single preference. However, a number of
recent papers have considered an extension of the traditional setting to groups, thereby allowing
us to capture the differing preferences within the same group as in our introductory example
with families [Manurangsi and Suksompong, 2017; Suksompong, 2018; Kyropoulou et al., 2019;
Segal-Halevi and Nitzan, 2019; Segal-Halevi and Suksompong, 2019, 2020]. Note that a con-
sensus halving is envy-free for all members of the two groups; moreover, it is equitable provided
that the utilities of the agents are additive and normalized so that every agent has the same
value for the entire set of items.
A classical fair division algorithm that dates back over two decades is the adjusted winner
procedure, which computes an envy-free and equitable division between two agents [Brams and Taylor,
1996].3 The procedure has been suggested for resolving divorce settlements and international
border disputes, with one of its advantages being the fact that it always splits at most one
item. Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi [2019] investigated the problem of attaining fairness while
minimizing the number of shared items, and gave algorithms and hardness results for several
variants of the problem. Like in our work, both the adjusted winner procedure and the work
of Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi [2019] assume that items are homogeneous and, as in Sec-
tion 2, that the agents’ utilities are linear in the fraction of each item and additive across items.
Moreover, both of them require the assumption that all items can be shared—if some items are
indivisible, then an envy-free or equitable allocation cannot necessarily be obtained.4
3See http://www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner for a demonstration and implementation of the procedure.
4This motivates relaxations such as envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any
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Besides consensus halving, another problem that also involves dividing items into equal parts
is necklace splitting, which can be seen as a discrete analog of consensus halving [Goldberg and West,
1985; Alon and West, 1986; Alon, 1987]. In a basic version of necklace splitting, there is a neck-
lace with beads of n colors, with each color having an even number of beads. Our task is
to split the necklace using at most n cuts and arrange the resulting pieces into two parts
so that the beads of each color are evenly distributed between both parts. Observe that
the difficulty of this problem lies in the spatial ordering of the beads—the problem would
be trivial if the beads were unordered items as in our setting. While consensus halving and
necklace splitting have long been studied by mathematicians, they recently gained significant
interest among computer scientists thanks in large part to new computational complexity re-
sults [Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2018; Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg, 2018, 2019; Deligkas et al., 2019;
Alon and Graur, 2020; Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2020a,b]. In particular, the PPA-completeness re-
sult of Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg [2018] for approximate consensus halving was the first such
result for a problem that is “natural” in the sense that its description does not involve a
polynomial-sized circuit.
2 Additive Utilities
We first formally define the problem of consensus halving for a set of items. There is a set
N = [n] of n agents and a set M = [m] of m items, where [r] := {1, 2, . . . , r} for any positive
integer r. A fractional set of items contains a fraction xj ∈ [0, 1] of each item j. We will mostly
be interested in fractional sets of items in which only a small number of items are fractional—
that is, most items have xj = 0 or 1. Agent i has a utility function ui that describes her
nonnegative utility for any fractional set of items; for an item j ∈M , we sometimes write ui(j)
to denote ui({j}). A partition of M into fractional sets of items M1, . . . ,Mk has the property
that for every item j ∈M , the fractions of item j in the k fractional sets sum up to exactly 1.
Definition 2.1. A consensus halving is a partition of M into two fractional sets of items M1
and M2 such that ui(M1) = ui(M2) for all i ∈ N . An item is said to be cut if there is a positive
fraction of it in both parts of the partition.
In this section, we assume that the agents’ utility functions are additive. This means that
for a set M ′ containing a fraction xj of item j, the utility of agent i is given by ui(M ′) =∑
j∈M xj · ui(j). Observe that under additivity, M
′ forms one part of a consensus halving
exactly when ∑
j∈M
xj · ui(j) =
1
2
∑
j∈M
ui(j) ∀i ∈ N. (1)
As we mentioned in the introduction, a consensus halving with no more than n cuts is guaranteed
to exist regardless of the number of items. Our first result shows that such a division can be
found efficiently for additive utilities.
Theorem 2.2. For n agents with additive utilities, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
that computes a consensus halving with at most min{n,m} cuts.
item (EFX), which have been extensively studied in the last few years (e.g., [Caragiannis et al., 2019;
Plaut and Roughgarden, 2020]). However, as Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi [2019] noted, when a divorcing
couple decides how to split their children or two siblings try to divide three houses between them, it is unlikely
that anyone will agree to a bundle that is envy-free up to one child or house.
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Proof. If n ≥ m, a partition that divides every item in half is clearly a consensus halving and
makes m = min{n,m} cuts. We therefore assume from now on that n ≤ m and describe a
polynomial-time algorithm that computes a consensus halving using no more than n cuts.
The main idea of our algorithm is to start with the trivial consensus halving where x1 =
x2 = · · · = xm = 1/2, and then gradually reduce the number of cuts. We stop when the process
cannot be continued, at which point we show that the consensus halving must contain at most
n cuts. Our algorithm is presented below.
1. Let x1 = x2 = · · · = xm = 1/2.
2. Let S denote the set of n equations
∑
j∈M
(
yj −
1
2
)
· ui(j) = 0 for i ∈ N , and let T = ∅.
3. While there exists a solution (y1, . . . , ym) 6= (x1, . . . , xm) to S ∪ T , do the following:
(a) For every j ∈M such that yj 6= xj , compute
γj :=
{ 1−xj
yj−xj if yj > xj ;
xj
xj−yj if yj < xj .
(b) Let j∗ = argminj∈M,yj 6=xj γj .
(c) For every j ∈M , let sj := (1− γj∗) · xj + γj∗ · yj, and update the value of xj to sj.
(d) Add the equation yj∗ = xj∗ to T .
4. Output (x1, . . . , xm).
Finding a solution (y1, . . . , ym) to S ∪ T that is not equal to (x1, . . . , xm) or determining that
such a solution does not exist (Step 3) can be done in polynomial time via Gaussian elimination.5
Moreover, it is obvious that the other steps of the algorithm run in polynomial time.
We next prove the correctness of our algorithm, starting with arguing that (x1, . . . , xm)
forms a consensus halving. Since we start with a consensus halving x1 = · · · = xm = 1/2, it
suffices to show that each execution of the loop in Step 3 preserves the validity of the solution.
Observe that, since both (x1, . . . , xm) and (y1, . . . , ym) are solutions to the equations (1), their
convex combination (in Step 3c) also satisfies the equations (1). Furthermore, for each j such
that yj 6= xj , the value γj is chosen so that if we replace γj∗ by γj in the formula for sj , we
would have sj = 1 for the case yj > xj, and sj = 0 for the case yj < xj . Since γj∗ ≤ γj , we
have that sj ∈ [0, 1] for all j such that yj 6= xj. In addition, the value of xj does not change for
j such that yj = xj. Thus, (x1, . . . , xm) remains a consensus halving throughout the algorithm.
Finally, we are left to show that at most n items are cut in the output (x1, . . . , xm). As noted
above, our definition of γj ensures that xj∗ ∈ {0, 1} after the execution of Step 3c. Furthermore,
as the constraint yj∗ = xj∗ is then immediately added to T , the value of xj∗ does not change
for the rest of the algorithm. As a result, every item j ∈ T is uncut. Thus, it suffices to show
that |T | ≥ m− n at the end of the execution.
When the while loop in Step 3 terminates, (x1, . . . , xm) must be the unique solution to S∪T .
Recall that a system of linear equations with m variables can only have a unique solution when
the number of constraints is at leastm. This means that |S∪T | ≥ m at the end of the algorithm.
Since |S| = n, we must have |T | ≥ m− n, as desired.
5Specifically, if the linear equations in S∪T lead to a unique solution (x1, . . . , xm), then Gaussian elimination
immediately results in this solution. Otherwise, Gaussian elimination will yield a row echelon form; by setting
one of the non-pivots yj to be an arbitrary number not equal to xj , we obtain a solution that is not equal to
(x1, . . . , xm).
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Figure 1: Consensus halving for items on a line: in this example there are 15 items (represented by
gray balls) that lie on a line and we have used 4 cuts to obtain a partition into fractional sets of items
(M1,M2). The labels M1 and M2 indicate the set to which each segment belongs.
Note that the above algorithm can be viewed as finding a vertex of the polytope defined by
the constraints (1) and 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1 for all j ∈M . In fact, it suffices to use a generic algorithm for
this task; however, to the best of our knowledge, such algorithms often involve solving a linear
program, whereas the algorithm presented above is conceptually simple and can be implemented
directly. We also remark that our algorithm works even when some utilities ui(j) are negative,
i.e., some of the items are goods while others are chores. Allocating a combination of goods
and chores has received increasing attention in the fair division community [Bogomolnaia et al.,
2017; Segal-Halevi, 2018; Aziz et al., 2019].
As we discussed in the introduction, an important reason behind the positive result in
Theorem 2.2 is the lack of linear order among the items. Indeed, as we show next, if the
items lie on a line and we are only allowed to cut the line using n cuts, finding a consensus
halving becomes computationally hard. This follows from discretizing the hardness result of
Filos-Ratsikas et al. [2020a] and holds even if we allow the consensus halving to be approximate
instead of exact. Formally, when the items lie on a line, we may place a number of cuts,
with each cut lying either between two adjacent items or at some position within an item. All
(fractional or whole) items between any two adjacent cuts must belong to the same fractional
set of items in a partition, where the left and right ends of the line also serve as “cuts” in
this requirement (see Figure 1 for an example). We say that a partition into fractional sets of
items (M1,M2) is an ε-approximate consensus halving if |ui(M1)−ui(M2)| ≤ ε ·ui(M) for every
agent i.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose that the items lie on a line. There exists a polynomial p such that
finding a 1/p(n)-approximate consensus halving for n agents with at most n cuts on the line
is PPA-hard, even if the valuations are binary and every agent values at most two contiguous
blocks of items.
Proof. We prove this by discretizing the hard instances constructed by Filos-Ratsikas et al.
[2020a, Theorem 2]. In their setting there are n agents who have piecewise-uniform valuation
functions v1, . . . , vn over the interval [0, 1].
6 By a closer inspection of their proof, we note that
the instances they construct have some useful properties. Namely, there exist polynomials p
and q such that:
1. Every agent has a two-block uniform valuation on [0, 1], i.e., the density of the valuation
function is piecewise-uniform and non-zero in at most two intervals. In other words, every
agent has (at most) two blocks of value and they have the same height.
2. There exists an integer d ≤ q(n) such that for all agents, the endpoints of the blocks are
rational numbers with denominator d.
6This means that for each agent i, the interval [0, 1] can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals so
that the density of the agent’s valuation function is either 0 or some constant ci over each interval.
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3. Finding a 1/p(n)-approximate consensus halving is PPA-hard.
Using these properties, we can construct an equivalent instance in our setting. We position
m = d items on a line, where the jth item represents the interval Ij := [(j − 1)/d, j/d] in
the original instance. Note that for every agent of the original instance, the density of their
valuation function is constant over Ij for each j. Thus, by letting
ui(j) =
{
1 if vi((j − 1)/d, j/d) > 0;
0 if vi((j − 1)/d, j/d) = 0
for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [d], we have exactly recreated the same valuation functions in our setting,
up to normalization. In particular, any 1/p(n)-approximate consensus halving of the items
using at most n cuts on the line immediately yields a 1/p(n)-approximate consensus halving of
v1, . . . , vn using at most n cuts on [0, 1], implying that our problem is also PPA-hard.
Although Theorem 2.2 allows us to efficiently compute a consensus halving with no more
than n cuts in any instance, for some instances there exists a solution using fewer cuts. An
extreme example is when all agents have the same utility function, in which case a single cut
already suffices. This raises the question of determining the least number of cuts required
for a given instance. Unfortunately, when there is a single agent, deciding whether there is a
consensus halving that leaves all items uncut is already equivalent to the well-known NP-hard
problem Partition. For general n, even computing a division that uses at most n − 1 cuts
more than the optimal solution is still computationally hard, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 2.4. For n agents with additive utilities, it is NP-hard to compute a consensus halving
that uses at most n− 1 cuts more than the minimum number of cuts for the same instance.
Proof. We reduce from the NP-hard problem Partition. Let w1, . . . , wr be the integers that
form a Partition instance. We construct a consensus halving instance I with n agents and
a set of n × r items M = {(ℓ, j) : ℓ ∈ [n], j ∈ [r]}. Every agent values a distinct set of items
according to the numbers w1, . . . , wr. Formally,
ui((ℓ, j)) =
{
wj if ℓ = i;
0 if ℓ 6= i
for all i, ℓ ∈ [n] and j ∈ [r]. It is easy to see that this instance has the following properties:
1. If w1, . . . , wr can be partitioned into two sets of equal sum, then our instance I admits a
consensus halving using no cut.
2. If w1, . . . , wr cannot be partitioned into two sets of equal sum, then any consensus halving
of our instance I uses at least n cuts. This is because in that case, for every agent i ∈ N ,
at least one of the items (i, 1), . . . , (i, r) must be cut.
As a result, in the first case, any consensus halving that uses at most n − 1 cuts more than
the minimum number of cuts will have at most n − 1 cuts. In the second case, any consensus
halving that uses at most n− 1 cuts more than the minimum number of cuts will have at least
n cuts. Thus, Partition reduces to the problem of computing a consensus halving that uses
at most n− 1 cuts more than the minimum number of cuts.
Theorem 2.4 implies that there is no hope of finding a consensus halving with the minimum
number of cuts or even a non-trivial approximation thereof in polynomial time, provided that P
6= NP. Nevertheless, we show that instances that admit a consensus halving with fewer than n
cuts are rare: if the utilities are drawn independently at random from probability distributions,
then it is almost surely the case that any consensus halving needs at least n cuts. We say that
a distribution is non-atomic if it does not put positive probability on any single point.
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Theorem 2.5. Suppose that for each i ∈ N and j ∈M , the utility ui(j) is drawn independently
from a non-atomic distribution Di,j . Then, with probability 1, every consensus halving uses at
least min{n,m} cuts.
Proof. The high-level idea is to show that if there are less than min{n,m} cuts, then a certain
utility ui(j) needs to take on a specific value; this event occurs with probability 0 since the
distribution Di,j is non-atomic.
Letmcut = min{n,m}−1. Recall that a consensus halving corresponds to a tuple (x1, . . . , xm) ∈
[0, 1]m for which the constraint (1) is satisfied, and that item j is cut if and only if xj /∈ {0, 1}.
As a result, from union bound, it suffices to show that for any fixed Mcut ⊆M of size mcut, we
have
Pr[∃(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ [0, 1]
m that satisfies (1) and xj ∈ {0, 1} for all j /∈Mcut] = 0. (2)
For notational convenience, we will only show that (2) holds for Mcut = {1, . . . ,mcut}; due to
symmetry, the same bound also holds for every Mcut ⊆M of size mcut.
To show (2) for Mcut = {1, . . . ,mcut}, we may apply the union bound again to derive
Pr[∃(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ [0, 1]
m that satisfies (1) and xj ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ {mcut + 1, . . . ,m}]
≤
∑
tmcut+1,...,tm∈{0,1}
Pr[∃x1, . . . , xmcut ∈ [0, 1] such that (x1, . . . , xmcut , tmcut+1, . . . , tm) satisfies (1)].
Hence, it suffices to show that, for any fixed tmcut+1, . . . , tm ∈ {0, 1}, we have
Pr[∃x1, . . . , xmcut ∈ [0, 1] such that (x1, . . . , xmcut , tmcut+1, . . . , tm) satisfies (1)] = 0.
To see that this is the case, consider any fixed values of ui(j) for all i ∈ N, j ∈Mcut; we will
show that the above probability is 0 over the randomness of the utilities ui(j) for i ∈ N, j /∈Mcut.
We may rearrange the constraint (1) as∑
j∈Mcut
ui(j) · xj =
1
2
∑
j∈Mcut
ui(j) +
∑
j /∈Mcut
(
1
2
− tj
)
· ui(j) ∀i ∈ N. (3)
Now, since there are n linear equations and only mcut < n variables x1, . . . , xmcut , the coefficient
vectors (u1(1), . . . , u1(mcut)), . . . , (un(1), . . . , un(mcut)) must be linearly dependent. In other
words, there exists (a1, . . . , an) 6= (0, . . . , 0) such that∑
i∈N
ai · ui(j) = 0 ∀j ∈Mcut.
Hence, by taking the corresponding linear combination of (3), we have
0 =
∑
j∈Mcut
xj
(∑
i∈N
ai · ui(j)
)
=
∑
i∈N
ai
 ∑
j∈Mcut
xj · ui(j)

=
∑
i∈N
ai
1
2
·
∑
j∈Mcut
ui(j) +
∑
j /∈Mcut
(
1
2
− tj
)
· ui(j)
 .
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From (a1, . . . , an) 6= (0, . . . , 0), there exists i
∗ ∈ N such that ai∗ 6= 0. Moreover, sincemcut < m,
we have m /∈Mcut. The above equality therefore implies that
ui∗(m) =
1(
tm −
1
2
)(∑
i∈N
i6=i∗
ai
ai∗
1
2
·
∑
j∈Mcut
ui(j) +
∑
j /∈Mcut
(
1
2
− tj
)
· ui(j)

+
1
2
·
∑
j∈Mcut
ui∗(j) +
∑
j /∈Mcut
j 6=m
(
1
2
− tj
)
· ui∗(j)
),
where tm − 1/2 is nonzero because tm ∈ {0, 1}. Since Di∗,m is non-atomic and the utilities are
drawn independently, the above equality occurs with probability 0, which implies that
Pr[∃x1, . . . , xmcut ∈ [0, 1] such that (x1, . . . , xmcut , tmcut+1, . . . , tm) satisfies (1)] = 0.
As discussed, this in turn implies that the probability that there is a consensus halving with at
most mcut cuts is 0, concluding our proof.
We now comment on the necessity of the two distributional assumptions in Theorem 2.5.
• Non-atomicity condition: Suppose n = 1 and D1,j is the Bernoulli distribution with
p = 1/2 for all j ∈ M , i.e., u1(j) = 0 and u1(j) = 1 with probability 1/2 each. Then the
minimum number of cuts is 1 if ui(j) = 1 for an odd number of j, and 0 otherwise; the
probability that each event occurs is 1/2.
• Independence condition: Suppose all agents have the same utility function, i.e., the de-
pendence between the utilities is such that u1(j) = · · · = un(j) for all j ∈ [m]. In this
case, it is clear that no more than one cut is needed regardless of n and m.
As our final remark of this section, consider utility functions that are again additive across
items, but for which the utility of each item scales quadratically as opposed to linearly in the
fraction of the item. That is, for a set M ′ containing a fraction xj of item j, the utility of agent
i is given by ui(M
′) =
∑
j∈M x
2
j · ui(j). Even though these utility functions appear different
from the ones we have considered so far, it turns out that the set of consensus halvings remains
exactly the same. Indeed, a partition (M1,M2) is a consensus halving under the quadratic
functions if and only if∑
j∈M
x2j · ui(j) =
∑
j∈M
(1− xj)
2 · ui(j) ∀i ∈ N.
Since x2j − (1 − xj)
2 = xj − (1 − xj) = 2xj − 1, the above condition is equivalent to (1), so all
of our results in this section apply to the quadratic functions as well.
3 Monotonic Utilities
Next, we turn our attention to utility functions that are no longer additive as in Section 2. We
assume that the utilities are monotonic, meaning that the utility of an agent for a set of items
cannot decrease upon adding any fraction of an item to the set. Our main result is that finding a
consensus halving is computationally hard for such valuations; in fact, the hardness holds even
when the utilities take on a specific structure that we call symmetric-threshold. Symmetric-
threshold utilities are additive over items, and linear with symmetric thresholds within every
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item. Formally, the utility of agent i for a fractional set of items M ′ containing a fraction
xj ∈ [0, 1] of each item j can be written as ui(M
′) =
∑
j∈M fij(xj) · ui(j), where
fij(xj) :=

0 if xj ≤ cij ;
xj−cij
1−2cij if cij < xj < 1− cij ;
1 if xj ≥ 1− cij ,
xj
fij(xj)
1
cij 1− cij 1
0
where cij ∈ [0, 1/2) is the threshold or cap of agent i for item j. Intuitively, symmetric-threshold
utilities model settings where having a small fraction of an item is the same as not having the
item at all, while having a large fraction of the item is the same as having the whole item. The
point where this threshold behavior occurs is controlled by the cap cij , which can be different
for every pair (i, j) ∈ N ×M . It is easy to see that the resulting utility functions are indeed
monotonic. Note that although general monotonic utility functions do not necessarily admit a
concise representation (see the discussion preceding Theorem 4.3), symmetric-threshold utility
functions can be described succinctly.
Even though symmetric-threshold utility functions are very close to being additive, we show
that finding a consensus halving for such utilities is computationally hard. Recall that a partition
(M1,M2) is an ε-approximate consensus halving if |ui(M1)−ui(M2)| ≤ ε·ui(M) for every agent i.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a constant ε > 0 such that finding an ε-approximate consensus
halving for n agents with monotonic utilities that uses at most n cuts is PPAD-hard, even if all
agents have symmetric-threshold utilities.
Proof. We prove this result by reducing from a modified version of the generalized circuit prob-
lem. The generalized circuit problem is the main tool that has been used (implicitly or ex-
plicitly) to prove hardness of computing Nash equilibria in various settings [Chen et al., 2009;
Daskalakis et al., 2009; Rubinstein, 2018]. A generalized circuit is a generalization of an arith-
metic circuit, because it allows cycles, which means that instead of a simple computation, the
circuit now represents a constraint satisfaction problem. The version of the problem we use
is different from the standard one in two aspects. First, instead of the domain [0, 1], we use
[−1, 1], which is more adapted to the consensus halving problem. Second, we will only allow
the circuit to use three types of arithmetic gates. As we will show below, these modifications
do not change the complexity of the problem.
Formally, we consider the following simplified generalized circuits.
Definition 3.2. A simple generalized circuit is a pair (V,T ), where V is a set of nodes and T
is a set of gates. Every gate T ∈ T is a 5-tuple T = (G,u1, u2, v, ζ) where G ∈ {G+, G×−|ζ|, G1}
is the type of gate, u1, u2 are the input nodes (if applicable), ζ ∈ (0, 1] is the parameter (if
applicable), and v is the output node. In more detail:
• if G = G+, then u1, u2, v ∈ V (distinct) and ζ = nil,
• if G = G×−|ζ|, then u1, v ∈ V (distinct), u2 = nil and ζ ∈ (0, 1],
• if G = G1, then u1 = u2 = ζ = nil and v ∈ V .
We require that for any two gates T = (G,u1, u2, v, ζ) and T
′ = (G′, u′1, u
′
2, v
′, ζ ′) in T with
T 6= T ′, it holds that v 6= v′.
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Before we proceed, let us introduce some notation. We let T[−1,1] : R → [−1, 1] denote
truncation to [−1, 1], i.e., T[−1,1](x) = max{−1,min{1, x}}. Similarly, we also let T[0,1] denote
truncation to [0, 1]. Finally, we use the notation x = y ± z as a shorthand for |x− y| ≤ z.
Definition 3.3. Let ε > 0. The problem ε-simple-Gcircuit is defined as follows: given a
simple generalized circuit (V,T ), find an assignment x : V → [−1, 1] that ε-approximately
satisfies all the gates T = (G,u1, u2, v, ζ) in T , namely:
• if G = G+, then x[v] = T[−1,1](x[u1] + x[u2])± ε, (addition)
• if G = G×−|ζ|, then x[v] = −|ζ| · x[u1]± ε, (multiplication by −|ζ| for ζ ∈ (0, 1])
• if G = G1, then x[v] = 1± ε. (constant 1)
As mentioned earlier, it turns out that this modified version of the generalized circuit prob-
lem is also PPAD-hard. This can be proved by reducing from the standard ε-Gcircuit problem,
which was shown to be PPAD-hard even for constant ε by Rubinstein [2018]. The idea is that
these simple gates are enough to simulate all the gates in the standard version of the problem.
Both problems are in fact PPAD-complete, since they can be reduced to the problem of finding
an approximate Brouwer fixed point, but here we are only interested in the hardness.
Lemma 3.4. There exists a constant ε > 0 such that the ε-simple-Gcircuit problem is
PPAD-hard.
The proof of Lemma 3.4 can be found in Appendix B.
Let ε̂ > 0 be a constant for which the ε̂-simple-Gcircuit problem is PPAD-hard. We
will now show that the ε̂-simple-Gcircuit problem reduces to the problem of finding an ε-
approximate consensus halving for n agents with symmetric-threshold utilities that uses at most
n cuts.
Let (V,T ) be an instance of ε̂-simple-Gcircuit. Partition V into four sets V0∪V+∪V×∪V1,
where
• V0 contains every node that is not the output of any gate in T ,
• V+ contains every node that is the output of a G+ gate in T ,
• V× contains every node that is the output of a G×−|ζ| gate in T ,
• V1 contains every node that is the output of a G1 gate in T .
We construct a consensus halving instance with n = 2|V+| + |V×| + |V1| agents and m =
|V0|+ 2|V+|+ |V×|+ |V1|+ 1 items. For any node v ∈ V+ ∪ V× ∪ V1, let i(v) ∈ N = [n] denote
the corresponding agent, and for every v ∈ V+, let i
′(v) ∈ N denote the second corresponding
agent. For every v ∈ V , let j(v) ∈ M = [m] denote the corresponding item, and for every
v ∈ V+, let j
′(v) ∈ M denote the second corresponding item. Finally, let j∗ ∈ M denote the
single remaining item, which we call the special item.
It remains to specify the utility functions for the agents and the constant ε > 0. We will see
below that in any partition of M into two fractional sets of items (M1,M2), there is a simple
way to associate a value val(j) ∈ [−1, 1] to every item j ∈M . We will pick the agents’ utilities
so that in any ε-approximate consensus halving (with at most n cuts), these values must satisfy
the gate constraints in T .
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Value Encoding. Consider any partition of M into two fractional sets of items (M1,M2).
Let xj ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of item j in M1. This fraction xj ∈ [0, 1] encodes a number
val(j) ∈ [−1, 1] as follows:
val(j) =

−1 if xj ≤ 1/3;
6(xj − 1/2) if 1/3 < xj < 2/3;
1 if xj ≥ 2/3.
In other words, val(j) = T[−1,1](6xj − 3).
The main idea of the reduction is that the value x[v] of node v ∈ V will be given by val(j(v)).
Next, we show how to pick the utility functions in order to enforce the gate constraints in T .
In the construction below we assume that ε ≤ 1/10; the exact value of ε will be picked at the
end.
G×−|ζ| gates. For any gate (G×−|ζ|, u1, nil, v, ζ) ∈ T , where u1 ∈ V \ {v}, v ∈ V× and
ζ ∈ (0, 1], we do the following. Let j1 = j(u1), j = j(v) and i = i(v). We want to ensure
that in any solution to ε-approximate consensus halving, we have val(j) = −ζ · val(j1)± ε̂. To
achieve this we define the symmetric-threshold utility function of agent i as follows. For any
item ℓ /∈ {j1, j}, we let ui(ℓ) = 0 and ciℓ = 0. We let ui(j) = 1/ζ and cij = 0. For j1 we use
what we call a standard input utility function, which is defined as follows: ui(j1) = 1/3 and
cij1 = 1/3. Note that ui(M) = 1/3 + 1/ζ.
Consider any ε-approximate consensus halving (M1,M2). Then, it must hold that ui(M1) =
ui(M2)± ε · ui(M). First of all, since ui(j) > ui(M \ {j}) + ε · ui(M) and by monotonicity, this
implies that item j must be fractional in the partition (M1,M2), i.e., xj ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore,
we must have
fij1(xj1)ui(j1) + fij(xj)ui(j) = fij1(1− xj1)ui(j1) + fij(1− xj)ui(j)± ε · ui(M).
Since fiℓ(1− x) = 1− fiℓ(x) for any x ∈ [0, 1] and ℓ ∈M , this equation can be rewritten as
(2fij(xj)− 1)ui(j) = −(2fij1(xj1)− 1)ui(j1)± ε · ui(M).
By noting that fiℓ(x) = T[0,1]((x− ciℓ)/(1− 2ciℓ)), we obtain
(2xj − 1) · (1/ζ) = −(2T[0,1](3xj1 − 1)− 1) · (1/3) ± ε · ui(M).
Finally, by observing that 2T[0,1](3xj1 − 1) − 1 = T[−1,1](2(3xj1 − 1) − 1) = T[−1,1](6xj1 − 3) =
val(j1), we obtain
(6xj − 3) = −ζ · val(j1)± 3ζε · ui(M).
Now, this yields
val(j) = T[−1,1](6xj − 3) = T[−1,1](−ζ · val(j1))± 3ζε · ui(M) = −ζ · val(j1)± 4ε
where we used the fact that −ζ · val(j1) ∈ [−1, 1], ui(M) = 1/3 + 1/ζ and ζ ≤ 1. Thus, as long
as 4ε ≤ ε̂, this construction correctly enforces the gate constraint.
G1 gates. For any gate (G1, nil, nil, v, nil) ∈ T , where v ∈ V1, we do the following. Let
j = j(v) and i = i(v). We use the same construction as for G×−|ζ| gates with j1 = j∗ (the
special item) and ζ = 1. By the same arguments, it follows that in any ε-approximate solution
it must hold that val(j) = −val(j∗)± 4ε and item j must be fractional, i.e., xj ∈ (0, 1). Thus,
as long as 4ε ≤ ε̂ and val(j∗) = −1, this correctly enforces the gate constraint.
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G+ gates. For any gate (G+, u1, u2, v, nil) ∈ T , where u1 ∈ V \ {v}, u2 ∈ V \ {v, u1} and
v ∈ V+, we do the following. Let j1 = j(u1), j2 = j(u2), j = j(v) and j
′ = j′(v). We are going
to ensure that val(j′) = −T[−1,1](val(j1) + val(j2))± ε̂/2 and val(j) = −val(j′)± ε̂/2. Together,
these two constraints will enforce the gate constraint. The second constraint can easily be
enforced by using the same construction as for G×−|ζ| with j1 = j′(v), j = j(v), i = i(v) and
ζ = 1. By the same arguments, this will yield an error of at most ε̂/2, as long as 8ε ≤ ε̂, and
ensure that item j is fractional.
To enforce the first constraint, we define the utilities of agent i′ = i′(v) as follows. For any
item ℓ /∈ {j1, j2, j
′}, we let ui′(ℓ) = 0 and ci′ℓ = 0. We let ui′(j′) = 1 and ci′j′ = 0. For j1 and
j2 we use the standard input utility function as defined earlier. Note that ui′(M) = 5/3.
Consider any ε-approximate consensus halving (M1,M2). Then, it must hold that ui′(M1) =
ui′(M2)±ε·ui′(M). First of all, since ui′(j
′) > ui′(M \{j′})+ε·ui′ (M) and by monotonicity, this
implies that item j′ must be fractional in the partition (M1,M2), i.e., xj′ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore,
by the same arguments as for G×−|ζ| gates, we obtain that
6xj′ − 3 = −val(j1)− val(j2)± 3ε · ui(M).
Since val(j′) = T[−1,1](6xj′ − 3), it follows that val(j′) = −T[−1,1](val(j1) + val(j2)) ± 5ε. Thus,
this constraint is correctly enforced as long as 10ε ≤ ε̂.
We are now ready to complete the proof. Set ε = ε̂/10. Consider any ε-approximate
consensus halving (M1,M2) that uses at most n cuts. We claim that letting x[v] = val(j(v))
for all v ∈ V yields a solution to the ε̂-simple-Gcircuit instance. Indeed, by construction, all
gates of type G+ and G×−|ζ| are correctly enforced. For gates of type G1, they will be correctly
enforced if val(j∗) = −1, which we now prove. Note that in our construction, we have ensured
that for every v ∈ V+ ∪ V× ∪ V1, item j(v) must be fractional, and for every v ∈ V+, item
j′(v) must also be fractional. Since these 2|V+| + |V×| + |V1| = n items are fractional, and we
used at most n cuts, this means that all other items are not fractional. In particular, j∗ is not
fractional, i.e., xj∗ ∈ {0, 1}. Without loss of generality, assume that xj∗ = 0 (if xj∗ = 1, then
swap the roles of M1 and M2). It follows that val(j
∗) = −1.
4 Connections to Agreeable Sets
We now present some implications of results from consensus halving on the setting of com-
puting agreeable sets. Let us first formally define the agreeable set problem, introduced by
Manurangsi and Suksompong [2019].7 As in consensus halving, there is a set N of n agents and
a set M of m items. Agent i has a monotonic utility function ui over non-fractional sets of
items, where we assume the normalization ui(∅) = 0; this corresponds to a set function.
Definition 4.1. A subset of items M ′ ⊆ M is said to be agreeable to agent i if ui(M ′) ≥
ui(M\M
′).
As one of their main results, Manurangsi and Suksompong [2019] showed that for any n and
m, there exists a set of at most min
{
⌊m+n2 ⌋,m
}
items that is agreeable to all agents, and this
bound is tight. Their proof relies on a graph-theoretic statement often referred to as “Kneser’s
conjecture”, which specifies the chromatic number for a particular class of graphs called Kneser
graphs. Here we present a short alternative proof that works by arranging the items on a line
in arbitrary order, applying consensus halving, and rounding the resulting fractional partition.
7The notion of agreeability was introduced in an earlier conference version of the paper [Suksompong, 2016].
Gourve`s [2019] considered an extension of the problem that takes into account matroidal constraints.
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As a bonus, our proof yields an agreeable set that is composed of at most ⌊n/2⌋ + 1 blocks on
the line.
Theorem 4.2 (Manurangsi and Suksompong [2019]). For n agents with monotonic utilities,
there exists a subset M ′ ⊆M such that
|M ′| ≤ min
{⌊
m+ n
2
⌋
,m
}
and M ′ is agreeable to all agents.
Proof. Let s =
⌊
m+n
2
⌋
. If s ≥ m, the entire set of items M has size m = min{s,m} and is
agreeable to all agents due to monotonicity, so we may assume that s ≤ m. Arrange the items
on a line in arbitrary order, and extend the utility functions of the agents to fractional sets of
items in a continuous and monotonic fashion.8 Consider a consensus halving with respect to the
extended utilities that uses at most n cuts on the line; some of the cuts may cut through items,
whereas the remaining cuts are between adjacent items. Let r ≤ n be the number of items that
are cut by at least one cut. Without loss of generality, assume that the first partM ′ contains no
more full items than the second part M ′′, so M ′ contains at most
⌊
m−r
2
⌋
full items. By moving
all cut items from M ′′ to M ′ in their entirety, M ′ contains at most
⌊
m−r
2
⌋
+ r =
⌊
m+r
2
⌋
≤ s
items. Since we start with a consensus halving and only move fractional items from M ′′ to M ′,
we have that M ′ is agreeable to all agents. Moreover, one can check that M ′ is composed of at
most
⌈
n+1
2
⌉
=
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1 blocks on the line.
In light of Theorem 4.2, an important question is how efficiently we can compute an agreeable
set whose size matches the worst-case bound. Manurangsi and Suksompong [2019] addressed
this question by providing a polynomial-time algorithm for two agents with monotonic utilities
and three agents with “responsive” utilities, a class that lies between additive and monotonic
utilities. They left the complexity for higher numbers of agents as an open question, and con-
jectured that the problem is hard even when the number of agents is a larger constant. We
show that this is in fact not the case: the problem can be solved efficiently for any number
of agents with additive utilities, as well as for any constant number of agents with monotonic
utilities. Note that since the input of the problem for monotonic utilities can involve an ex-
ponential number of values (even for constant n), and consequently may not admit a succinct
representation, we assume a “utility oracle model” in which the algorithm is allowed to query
the utility ui(M
′) for any i ∈ N and M ′ ⊆M .
Theorem 4.3. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a set containing at most
min
{⌊
m+n
2
⌋
,m
}
items that is agreeable to all agents, for each of the following two cases:
(i) All agents have additive utilities.
(ii) All agents have monotonic utilities and the number of agents is constant (assuming access
to a utility oracle).
Proof. Similarly to Theorem 4.2, if n ≥ m we can simply include all items in our set, so we may
focus on the case n ≤ m. For (i), we first use our polynomial-time algorithm from Theorem 2.2
to find a consensus halving, and then compute an agreeable set of size at most
⌊
m+n
2
⌋
by
rounding the consensus halving as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Next, consider (ii). Recall that for any ordering of the items on a line, Theorem 4.2 guar-
antees the existence of an agreeable set of size at most
⌊
m+n
2
⌋
involving no more than n cuts
8For example, one can use the Lova´sz extension or the multilinear extension (see Section A.2).
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on the line. Fix an ordering of the items; we will perform a brute-force search over all (non-
fractional) partitions involving at most n cuts with respect to the ordering. For t ∈ [n], there
are O(mt) ways to place t cuts, and for each way, we have two candidate sets to check: one
including the leftmost item, and one not including it. A candidate set is valid if and only if
it has size at most
⌊
m+n
2
⌋
and is agreeable to all agents. Hence the brute-force search runs in
time
∑n
t=1O(m
t) = O(n ·mn) = O(mn), which is polynomial since n is constant.
5 Consensus k-Splitting
In this section, we address two important generalizations of consensus halving, both of which
were mentioned by Simmons and Su [2003]. In consensus splitting, instead of dividing the items
into two equal parts, we want to divide them into two parts so that all agents agree that the
split satisfies some given ratio, say two-to-one. In consensus 1/k-division, we want to divide
the items into k parts that all agents agree are equal. We consider a problem that generalizes
both of these problems at once.
Definition 5.1. Let α1, . . . , αk > 0 be real numbers such that α1 + · · ·+ αk = 1. A consensus
k-splitting with ratios α1, . . . , αk is a partition of M into k fractional sets of items M1, . . . ,Mk
such that
ui(M1)
α1
=
ui(M2)
α2
= · · · =
ui(Mk)
αk
∀i ∈ N.
When the ratios are clear from context, we will simply refer to such a partition as a consensus
k-splitting.
As in Section 2, we will assume that the utility functions are additive, in which case our desired
condition is equivalent to ui(Mℓ) = αℓ · ui(M) for all i ∈ N and ℓ ∈ [k].
While there is no reason to cut an item more than once in consensus halving, one may
sometimes wish to cut the same item multiple times in consensus k-splitting in order to split
the item across three or more parts. Hence, even though the number of cuts made is always
at least the number of items cut, the two quantities are not necessarily the same in consensus
k-splitting. If there are n items and each agent only values a single distinct item, then it is
clear that we already need to make (k − 1)n cuts for any ratios α1, . . . , αk, in particular k − 1
cuts for each item. Nevertheless, it could still be that for some ratios, it is always possible to
achieve a consensus k-splitting by cutting fewer than (k − 1)n items. We show that this is not
the case: for any set of ratios, cutting (k − 1)n items is necessary in the worst case.
Theorem 5.2. For any ratios α1, . . . , αk > 0, there exists an instance with additive utilities in
which any consensus k-splitting with these ratios cuts at least (k − 1)n items.
Proof. Fix α1, . . . , αk > 0. We construct an instance such that each agent i has utility 1/b for
each of the b items in a set Bi, where b is an integer that we will choose later, and utility 0 for
every other item. The sets B1, . . . , Bn are pairwise disjoint. Note that ui(M) = ui(Bi) = 1 for
every i. It suffices to choose b such that at least k − 1 items in each set Bi must be cut in any
consensus k-splitting with ratios α1, . . . , αk. By symmetry, we may focus on the first agent and
the corresponding set B1.
For any real number x, denote by ⌊x⌋ its floor function, and let {x} = x − ⌊x⌋. We will
choose b such that
{α1b}+ {α2b}+ · · · + {αkb} > k − 2. (4)
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To see why this is sufficient, observe that each uncut item must belong to one of the k parts in
its entirety. The number of uncut items in B1 is therefore at most⌊
α1
1/b
⌋
+ · · ·+
⌊
αk
1/b
⌋
= ⌊α1b⌋+ · · ·+ ⌊αkb⌋,
meaning that the number of cut items in B1 is at least
b− (⌊α1b⌋+ · · · + ⌊αkb⌋) = (α1b+ · · ·+ αkb)− (⌊α1b⌋+ · · ·+ ⌊αkb⌋)
= (α1b− ⌊α1b⌋) + · · ·+ (αkb− ⌊αkb⌋)
= {α1b}+ · · · + {αkb}
> k − 2,
where the first equality follows from α1+ · · ·+αk = 1. Since b, ⌊α1b⌋, . . . , ⌊αkb⌋ are all integers,
this implies that at least k − 1 items in B1 must be cut.
It remains to show the existence of b for which (4) is satisfied. Let s be an integer such that
s > max
{
k,
1
α1
, . . . ,
1
αk
,
1
1− α1
, . . . ,
1
1− αk
}
.
Divide the interval [0, 1] into subintervals of length at most 1/s each. By the pigeonhole princi-
ple, there exist positive integers p, q such that q ≥ p+ 2, and {αip} and {αiq} fall in the same
subinterval for every i ∈ [k]. Letting c = q− p, we have that for each i ∈ [k], either {αic} < 1/s
or {αic} > 1− 1/s.
Take b = c− 1 ≥ 1. From our choice of s, we have 1/s < αi < 1− 1/s for all i ∈ [k]. Thus,
for each i, if {αic} < 1/s then {αic} < αi, while if {αic} > 1− 1/s then {αic} > αi. In either
case, we have {αib} = {αic− αi} > 1− 1/s − αi, so
{α1b}+ · · · + {αkb} > k − k/s− (α1 + · · · + αk) > k − 2,
where we use the assumption that s > k. Hence (4) is satisfied, and the proof is complete.
Next, we show that computing a consensus k-splitting with at most (k − 1)n cuts can be
done efficiently using a generalization of our algorithm for consensus halving (Theorem 2.2).
Note that such a splitting also cuts at most (k − 1)n items.
Theorem 5.3. For n agents with additive utilities and ratios α1, . . . , αk, there is a polynomial-
time algorithm that computes a consensus k-splitting with these ratios using at most (k − 1) ·
min{n,m} cuts.
Proof. Let us start with the case k = 2, which can then be used as a subroutine for the case
k > 2. Our algorithm for consensus 2-splitting generalizes the consensus halving algorithm in
Theorem 2.2, so we only highlight the differences. To find a consensus 2-splitting with ratios
α1, α2, the only change to the algorithm in Theorem 2.2 is that we initialize x1 = · · · = xm = α1
and let S be the set of n equations
∑
j∈M(yj − α1) · ui(j) for i ∈ N . By analogous arguments
as in Theorem 2.2, this modified algorithm produces a consensus 2-splitting with ratios α1, α2
in polynomial time and uses at most min{n,m} cuts.
We now move on to the case k > 2. In this case, we simply apply the above consensus
2-splitting algorithm successively, each time producing one additional part at the expense of at
most min{n,m} cuts. This is stated more precisely below.
1. Let Mremaining = M .
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2. For ℓ = 1, . . . , k − 1:
(a) (Mℓ,Mremaining)← consensus 2-splitting ofMremaining with ratios
αℓ
αℓ+···+αn ,
αℓ+1+···+αn
αℓ+···+αn .
3. Output (M1, . . . ,Mk−1,Mremaining)
It is clear that the output is a consensus k-splitting with ratios α1, . . . , αk, and that the algorithm
runs in polynomial time. Finally, observe that each time we apply the consensus 2-splitting
algorithm, if there are m′ items left, we additionally use at most min{n,m′} ≤ min{n,m} cuts.
As a result, the total number of cuts is at most (k − 1) ·min{n,m}, as desired.
As in Theorem 2.2, our algorithm does not require the nonnegativity assumption on the
utilities and therefore works for combinations of goods and chores.
When the items lie on a line, there is always a consensus halving that makes at most n cuts
on the line and therefore cuts at most n items—this matches the upper bound on the number
of items cut in the absence of a linear order. Theorem 5.3 shows that the bound n continues
to hold for consensus splitting into two parts with any ratios. As we show next, however, this
bound is no longer achievable for some ratios with ordered items, thereby demonstrating another
difference that the lack of linear order makes.9
Theorem 5.4. Let n ≥ 2, k = 2 and (α1, α2) = (
1
n ,
n−1
n ). There exists an instance such that
the n agents have additive utilities, the items lie on a line, and any consensus k-splitting with
ratios α1 and α2 makes at least 2n − 4 cuts on the line.
Proof. We discretize a slight modification of an instance used by Stromquist and Woodall [1985]
to show a lower bound on the number of cuts when the resource is represented by a one-
dimensional circle. Suppose that there are n2−1 “primary items”, which we label as 1, 2, . . . , n2−
1 according to their linear order. Moreover, there are n2 − 2 “secondary items”, one between
every adjacent pair of primary items. The utilities of the agents are as follows:
• For i ∈ [n − 1], agent i has utility 1n+1 for each of the n + 1 primary items i, i + (n −
1), . . . , i+ n(n− 1), and utility 0 for all secondary items.
• Agent n has value 1
n2−2 for each secondary item, and value 0 for all primary items.
Note that ui(M) = 1 for all i. Let M
′ be a fractional set of items for which all agents have
utility 1/n. Since each agent i ∈ [n− 1] has utility 1n+1 for a primary item, M
′ must contain a
positive fraction of at least two primary items that the agent values. These items are disjoint
for different agents, so M ′ necessarily contains a positive fraction of at least 2n − 2 primary
items. On the other hand, the utility function of agent n implies that M ′ can contain at most⌊
1/n
1/(n2−2)
⌋
= n− 1 entire secondary items.
Suppose that M ′ is composed of r non-adjacent intervals I1, . . . , Ir. Notice that for any
interval I on the line, if the interval contains a positive fraction of t1(I) primary items, along
with t2(I) entire secondary items, then t1(I) ≤ t2(I) + 1. Hence, we have
2n − 2 ≤
r∑
i=1
t1(Ii) ≤
r∑
i=1
t2(Ii) + r ≤ n− 1 + r,
implying that r ≥ n−1. This means that the consensus 2-splitting with M ′ as one part involves
at least 2(n − 1) = 2n − 2 cuts, possibly including endpoints of the line. At most two of these
cuts can correspond to endpoints, implying that the number of cuts made is at least 2n− 4, as
desired.
9See the definition of the consensus halving problem on a line before Theorem 2.3.
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For consensus halving, Theorem 2.5 shows that in a random instance, any solution almost
surely uses at least the worst-case number of cuts min{n,m}. One might consequently expect
that an analogous statement holds for consensus k-splitting, with (k−1) ·min{n,m} cuts almost
always being required. However, we show that this is not true: even in the simple case where
n = 1 and the agent’s utilities are drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, 1], it is likely
that we only need to make one cut (instead of k − 1) for large m.
Theorem 5.5. Let n = 1, and suppose that the agent’s utility for each item is drawn indepen-
dently from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. For any ratios α1, . . . , αk > 0, with probability
approaching 1 as m → ∞, there exists a consensus k-splitting with these ratios using at most
one cut. Moreover, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes such a solution.
In what follows, we denote the agent’s utility function by u, and say that an event happens
“with high probability” if the probability that it happens approaches 1 as m → ∞. The
proof of Theorem 5.5 proceeds by identifying a simple (deterministic) condition that guarantees
a solution cutting only a single item; this is done in Lemma 5.6. Then, we show that this
condition is satisfied with high probability.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose that there is a single agent. Let j∗ := argmaxj u(j) denote a most-
preferred item, and letMlow-utility := {j ∈M | u(j) ≤
1
k ·u(j
∗)} denote the set of items whose util-
ity is less than 1/k times the utility of j∗. For any ratios α1, . . . , αk > 0, if
∑
j∈Mlow-utility u(j) ≥
k · u(j∗), then there is a consensus k-splitting with these ratios that cuts only j∗. Moreover,
there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes such a solution.
Proof. For each ℓ ∈ [k], let wℓ := αℓ · (
∑
j∈M u(j)) be the “target utility” for part ℓ of the
partition. Consider the following greedy algorithm.
• Let P1 = · · · = Pk = ∅.
• Let M0 = M \ {j∗} and jmax = argmaxj∈M0 u(j).
• While there exists ℓ ∈ [k] such that u(Pℓ ∪ {j
max}) ≤ wℓ:
– Add jmax to Pℓ.
– Remove jmax fromM0. IfM0 = ∅, terminate. Else, update jmax = argmaxj∈M0 u(j).
The algorithm clearly runs in polynomial time. We claim that it terminates with M0 = ∅
provided that
∑
j∈Mlow-utility u(j) ≥ k · u(j
∗). This implies the statement of the lemma, because
it would then suffice to split only item j∗.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that M0 6= ∅ at the end of the execution. Consider
the following two cases, based on whether jmax at termination belongs to Mlow-utility.
• Case 1: jmax /∈ Mlow-utility. Since the algorithm terminates, it must be that u(Pℓ) >
wℓ − u(j
max) ≥ wℓ − u(j
∗) for each ℓ. Summing this over ℓ ∈ [k], we get
u (P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk) > w1 + · · ·+ wk − k · u(j
∗) = u(M)− k · u(j∗).
On the other hand, since jmax /∈ Mlow-utility, it must be that Mlow-utility is disjoint from
P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk. As a result, we have
u (P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk) ≤ u(M)−
∑
j∈Mlow-utility
u(j) ≤ u(M)− k · u(j∗),
where the second inequality is from the assumption of the lemma. The above two inequal-
ities imply the desired contradiction.
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• Case 2: jmax ∈Mlow-utility. In this case, we must have u(Pℓ) > wℓ−u(j
max) ≥ wℓ−u(j
∗)/k
for each ℓ. Summing this over ℓ ∈ [k], we get
u (P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk) > w1 + · · ·+ wk − u(j
∗) = u(M)− u(j∗).
However, since j∗ /∈ P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk, we have u (P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk) ≤ u(M) − u(j∗), which is a
contradiction.
In both cases, we arrive at a contradiction, and our proof is complete.
With Lemma 5.6 ready, we can now prove Theorem 5.5.
Proof of Theorem 5.5. Since each u(j) is drawn independently from the uniform distribution
on [0, 1], the probability that u(j∗) ≥ 1/2 is 1 − 1/2m, which converges to 1 for large m. In
addition, since u(j) ∈ [0.1/k, 0.5/k] with probability 0.4/k for each j, a standard Chernoff
bound argument implies that with probability approaching 1, we have
M ′ := |{j ∈M | u(j) ∈ [0.1/k, 0.5/k]}| ≥ 0.3m/k.
The union bound implies that both events occur simultaneously with high probability. Suppose
that they both occur and m ≥ 40k3. From the first event, we have u(j) ≤ 0.5/k ≤ u(j∗)/k for
each j ∈M ′, and so M ′ ⊆Mlow-utility. Hence, the second event implies that∑
j∈Mlow-utility
u(j) ≥
∑
j∈M ′
u(j) ≥ (0.3m/k)(0.1/k) ≥ k ≥ k · u(j∗).
From this and Lemma 5.6, we conclude that with high probability, we can efficiently find a
consensus k-splitting that cuts only a single item, as claimed.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied a natural version of the consensus halving problem where, in contrast
to prior work, the items do not have a linear structure. We showed that computing a consensus
halving with at most n cuts in our version can be done in polynomial time for additive utilities,
but already becomes PPAD-hard for a class of monotonic utilities that are very close to addi-
tive. We also demonstrated several extensions and connections to the problems of consensus
k-splitting and agreeable sets.
While our PPAD-hardness result serves as strong evidence that consensus halving for a set of
items is computationally hard for non-additive utilities, it remains open whether the result can
be strengthened to PPA-completeness—indeed, the membership of the problem in PPA follows
from a reduction to consensus halving on a line, as explained in the introduction. Obtaining
a PPA-hardness result will most likely require new ideas and perhaps even new insights into
PPA, since all existing PPA-hardness results for consensus halving heavily rely on the linear
structure. Of course, it is also possible that the problem is in fact PPAD-complete. In addition
to consensus halving, settling the computational complexity of the agreeable sets problem for a
non-constant number of agents with monotonic utilities would also be of interest.
Another important question that arises from our work is whether there always exists a
consensus k-splitting with at most (k − 1)n cuts when items do not lie on a line and agents
have monotonic utilities. If these utilities are also additive, the claim holds by Theorem 5.3;
for consensus halving, the claim also holds by reducing to the linear version. However, for non-
additive utilities and unequal ratios, this reduction technique no longer works: even for k = 2,
we may already need to make more than n cuts on the line (Theorem 5.4). From a broader
point of view, our work illustrates the richness of consensus halving and related problems, which
we believe deserve further study.
19
Acknowledgments
This work was partially supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under grant num-
ber 639945 (ACCORD), by an EPSRC doctoral studentship (Reference 1892947), and by JST,
ACT-X.
References
Noga Alon and Andrei Graur. Efficient splitting of measures and necklaces. CoRR,
abs/2006.16613, 2020.
Noga Alon and Douglas B. West. The Borsuk-Ulam theorem and bisection of necklaces. Pro-
ceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 98(4):623–628, 1986.
Noga Alon. Splitting necklaces. Advances in Mathematics, 63(3):247–253, 1987.
A. K. Austin. Sharing a cake. The Mathematical Gazette, 66(437):212–215, 1982.
Haris Aziz, Ioannis Caragiannis, Ayumi Igarashi, and Toby Walsh. Fair allocation of indivisible
goods and chores. In Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 53–59, 2019.
Vittorio Bilo`, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Do-
minik Peters, Cosimo Vinci, and William S. Zwicker. Almost envy-free allocations with
connected bundles. In Proceedings of the 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
Conference (ITCS), pages 14:1–14:21, 2019.
Anna Bogomolnaia, Herve´ Moulin, Fedor Sandomirskiy, and Elena Yanovskaya. Competitive
division of a mixed manna. Econometrica, 85(6):1847–1871, 2017.
Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor. Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution.
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor. The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to
Everybody. W. W. Norton & Company, 1999.
Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Herve´ Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and
Junxing Wang. The unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash welfare. ACM Transactions on
Economics and Computation, 7(3):12:1–12:32, 2019.
Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng. Settling the complexity of computing two-player
Nash equilibria. Journal of the ACM, 56(3):14:1–14:57, 2009.
Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, and Christos H. Papadimitriou. The complexity
of computing a Nash equilibrium. SIAM Journal on Computing, 39(1):195–259, 2009.
Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Themistoklis Melissourgos, and Paul G. Spirakis. Computing
exact solutions of consensus halving and the Borsuk-Ulam theorem. In Proceedings of the
46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP), pages
138:1–138:14, 2019.
Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Paul W. Goldberg. Consensus halving is PPA-complete. In Proceedings
of the 50th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 51–64,
2018.
20
Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Paul W. Goldberg. The complexity of splitting necklaces and bisecting
ham sandwiches. In Proceedings of the 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of
Computing (STOC), pages 638–649, 2019.
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Paul W. Goldberg, and Jie Zhang. Hard-
ness results for consensus-halving. In Proceedings of the 43rd International Symposium on
Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS), pages 24:1–24:16, 2018.
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros Hollender, Katerina Sotiraki, and Manolis Zampetakis.
Consensus-halving: Does it ever get easier? In Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference
on Economics and Computation (EC), 2020. Forthcoming.
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros Hollender, Katerina Sotiraki, and Manolis Zampetakis. A topo-
logical characterization of modulo-p arguments and implications for necklace splitting. CoRR,
abs/2003.11974, 2020.
Charles H. Goldberg and Douglas B. West. Bisection of circle colorings. SIAM Journal on
Algebraic Discrete Methods, 6(1):93–106, 1985.
Laurent Gourve`s. Agreeable sets with matroidal constraints. Journal of Combinatorial Opti-
mization, 37(3):866–888, 2019.
Charles R. Hobby and John R. Rice. A moment problem in L1 approximation. Proceedings of
the American Mathematical Society, 16(4):665–670, 1965.
Maria Kyropoulou, Warut Suksompong, and Alexandros A. Voudouris. Almost envy-freeness
in group resource allocation. In Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 400–406, 2019.
Pasin Manurangsi and Warut Suksompong. Asymptotic existence of fair divisions for groups.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 89:100–108, 2017.
Pasin Manurangsi and Warut Suksompong. Computing a small agreeable set of indivisible
items. Artificial Intelligence, 268:96–114, 2019.
Herve´ Moulin. Fair Division and Collective Welfare. MIT Press, 2003.
Jerzy Neyman. Un the´ore`me d’existence. Comptes Rendus de l’Acade´mie des sciences, 222:843–
845, 1946.
Hoon Oh, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Warut Suksompong. Fairly allocating many goods with few
queries. In Proceedings of the 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages
2141–2148, 2019.
Benjamin Plaut and Tim Roughgarden. Almost envy-freeness with general valuations. SIAM
Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 34(2):1039–1068, 2020.
Tim Roughgarden. Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press,
2016.
Aviad Rubinstein. Inapproximability of Nash equilibrium. SIAM Journal on Computing,
47(3):917–959, 2018.
Fedor Sandomirskiy and Erel Segal-Halevi. Fair division with minimal sharing. CoRR,
abs/1908.01669, 2019.
21
Steffen Schuldenzucker and Sven Seuken. Monotonic and non-monotonic solution concepts for
generalized circuits. CoRR, abs/1907.12854, 2019.
Erel Segal-Halevi and Shmuel Nitzan. Fair cake-cutting among families. Social Choice and
Welfare, 53(4):709–740, 2019.
Erel Segal-Halevi and Warut Suksompong. Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods.
Artificial Intelligence, 277:103167, 2019.
Erel Segal-Halevi and Warut Suksompong. How to cut a cake fairly: a generalization to groups.
American Mathematical Monthly, 2020. Forthcoming.
Erel Segal-Halevi. Fairly dividing a cake after some parts were burnt in the oven. In Proceed-
ings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS), pages 1276–1284, 2018.
Forest W. Simmons and Francis Edward Su. Consensus-halving via theorems of Borsuk-Ulam
and Tucker. Mathematical Social Sciences, 45(1):15–25, 2003.
Walter Stromquist and D. R. Woodall. Sets on which several measures agree. Journal of
Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 108:241–248, 1985.
Warut Suksompong. Assigning a small agreeable set of indivisible items to multiple players.
In Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI),
pages 489–495, 2016.
Warut Suksompong. Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents. Mathematical Social
Sciences, 92:40–47, 2018.
Jan Vondra´k. CS 369P: Polyhedral techniques in combinatorial optimization, Lecture 17, 2010.
Available at http://theory.stanford.edu/˜jvondrak/CS369P/lec17.pdf.
A Constant Number of Agents
In this section, we provide additional results for the case where there are a constant number of
agents who are endowed with monotonic utilities.
A.1 Discrete Consensus Halving
We begin by introducing a discrete version of consensus halving, which allows us to focus solely
on the agents’ utilities for non-fractional sets of items.
Definition A.1. A discrete consensus halving is a partition of the items into three (non-
fractional) sets of itemsM0,M1,M2 such that ui(M0∪M1) ≥ ui(M2) and ui(M0∪M2) ≥ ui(M1)
for all i ∈ N .
Note that for any r, a consensus halving with r cuts yields a discrete consensus halving with
|M0| ≤ r simply by moving all cut items into M0. Hence, a discrete consensus halving with
|M0| ≤ n is guaranteed to exist. The bound n is also tight here: when each agent values a single
distinct item, all valued items must be included in M0.
The following result shows that for constant n, a discrete consensus halving with |M0| ≤ n
can be found efficiently. Similarly to Theorem 4.2, the proof involves arranging the items on a
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line and appealing to the existence of a consensus halving with at most n cuts on the line. As
in Theorem 4.3, we assume a utility oracle model in which the algorithm can query the utility
ui(M
′) for any i ∈ N and M ′ ⊆M .
Theorem A.2. For any constant number of agents with monotonic utilities, there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm that computes a discrete consensus halving with |M0| ≤ min{n,m}
(assuming access to a utility oracle).
Proof. If n ≥ m, we can simply include all items in M0, so assume that n ≤ m. Arrange the
items on a line in arbitrary order, and extend the utility functions of the agents to fractional
sets of items in a continuous and monotonic fashion (see footnote 8). Consider a consensus
halving with respect to the extended utilities that uses at most n cuts on the line, and move all
cut items to M0. The resulting discrete consensus halving has the property that for any pair of
consecutive items in M0, the block of items in between either all belong to M1 or all belong to
M2.
We perform a brute-force search over all possible partitions of the items into M0,M1,M2
satisfying the above property. For t ∈ [n], there are O(mt) sets of items that we can choose
as M0, and for each choice of M0, there are at most 2
t+1 ways to assign the resulting blocks
of items to M1 or M2. Hence the brute-force search runs in time
∑n
t=1O(2
t+1mt) = O(mn),
which is polynomial since n is constant.
With two agents, the algorithm in Theorem A.2 runs in quadratic time. We next present
a more sophisticated algorithm that uses only linear time for this special case. In fact, we will
show a stronger statement based on a notion introduced by Kyropoulou et al. [2019].
Definition A.3. Let n = 2. A partition of the items into two (non-fractional) sets of items
M1 and M2 is said to be Exact1 if for each pair i, k ∈ {1, 2}, either M3−k = ∅ or there exists
an item j ∈M3−k such that ui(Mk) ≥ ui(M3−k\{j}).
In words, Exact1 means that for each agent and each part of the partition, this part can
be made at least as valuable as the other part in the agent’s view by removing at most one
item from the latter part. Given an Exact1 partition, we can easily obtain a discrete consensus
halving as follows. From the partition, each agent i proposes (at most) one item to include
in M0. Specifically, if ui(M1) < ui(M2), then agent i proposes an item j such that ui(M1) ≥
ui(M2\{j}); the opposite case is analogous. (If ui(M1) = ui(M2), agent i does not need to
propose any item.) It is clear that |M0| ≤ 2, and one can check that (M0,M1,M2) forms a
discrete consensus halving.
Kyropoulou et al. [2019] showed that an Exact1 partition exists for two agents with “respon-
sive utilities”, a class that lies between additive and monotonic utilities. Here, we present an
algorithm that computes an Exact1 partition for arbitrary monotonic utilities in linear time—to
the best of our knowledge, even the existence of such a partition has not been established before.
Our algorithm is based on carefully discretizing a procedure of Austin [1982], which computes
a (non-discrete) consensus halving for two agents assuming that the resource is represented by
the circumference of a circle. Austin’s procedure works by letting the first agent place two
knives on the circle so that the item is cut in half according to her valuation. The agent then
moves both knives continuously clockwise, maintaining the invariant that the knives divide the
items into two equal halves in her opinion. The first agent stops moving the knives when the
two parts are equal according to the valuation of the second agent, and the procedure returns
the resulting partition. Since the second knife would reach the initial position of the first knife
at the same time as the first knife reaches the starting point of the second knife, it follows from
the intermediate value theorem that the procedure necessarily terminates.
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The main challenge in applying this procedure to our discrete item setting is that it is not
a priori clear how to implement moving both knives simultaneously—indeed, moving each of
the knives over one item does not always maintain the invariant that the partition is Exact1.
Nevertheless, as we will show, this invariant can be maintained by either moving both knives
or moving one of the two knives, whichever option is appropriate at each stage. In fact, for this
algorithm and proof, we will use a slightly stronger definition of Exact1 wherein the items lie
on a circle, each part of the partition forms a contiguous block on the circle, and the item j in
Definition A.3 is only allowed to be one of the items at the end of block M3−k.10 We say that
a partition is Exact1 for agent i if the (stronger) Exact1 condition is fulfilled for agent i and
both k ∈ {1, 2}.
Algorithm 1 (for two agents with monotonic utilities)
Step 1: Arrange the items on a circle in arbitrary order. Place the first knife between two
arbitrary consecutive items on the circle, and the second knife between two items so that
the partition induced by the two knives is Exact1 for the first agent.
Step 2: If the current partition is Exact1 for the second agent, return this partition.
Step 3: If one of the knives is at the initial position of the other knife, go to Step 4. Else,
perform one of the following actions so that the new partition remains Exact1 for the first
agent:
(a) Move the first knife clockwise by one position.
(b) Move the second knife clockwise by one position.
(c) Move each of the two knives clockwise by one position.
Go back to Step 2.
Step 4: Move the knife that is not at the initial position of the other knife clockwise by one
position. Go back to Step 2.
Theorem A.4. For two agents with monotonic utilities, Algorithm 1 computes an Exact1
partition in time linear in m (assuming access to a utility oracle).
Proof. Observe that throughout the algorithm, the partition induced by the two knives is Exact1
for the first agent. Moreover, a partition is returned only if it is Exact1 for the second agent.
Hence, if the algorithm terminates, the partition that it outputs is Exact1 for both agents. It
therefore suffices to establish that the algorithm is well-defined and always terminates. For
convenience, we will say that a bundle is envy-free up to one item (EF1) for a specific agent
if the Exact1 condition (specifically, the stronger version described before the algorithm) is
fulfilled for the agent when that bundle is taken as Mk.
First, we need to show that in Step 1, there exists a position of the second knife such that
the resulting partition is Exact1 for the first agent. It turns out that this already follows from
Theorem 3.1 of Oh et al. [2019], so the first step can be implemented.
Next, the key part of our proof is to show that in Step 3, at least one of the three actions
keeps the new partition Exact1 for the first agent. Assume that actions (a) and (b) do not;
10A notion in the same spirit called “envy-freeness up to one outer good” was proposed by Bilo` et al. [2019].
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Figure 2: An illustration of Algorithm 1.
we claim that action (c) does. Call the two parts of the partition M1 and M2, and assume
without loss of generality that moving the first knife clockwise would enlarge M1. Suppose
that the next item that the first knife would move over is j, and the next item that the second
knife would move over is j′. (See Figure 2 for an illustration.) Let O1 = (M1 ∪ {j})\{j′} and
O2 = (M2∪{j
′})\{j} be the two parts of the partition that results from action (c). Since action
(a) does not keep the partition Exact1, we have that M2\{j} is not EF1 for the first agent.
Hence,
u1(O1) = u1((M1 ∪ {j})\{j
′}) > u1(M2\{j}) = u1(O2\{j′}),
implying that O1 is EF1 for the first agent. By symmetry, since action (b) does not keep the
partition Exact1, we have that M1\{j
′} is not EF1 for the first agent. This implies that O2 is
EF1 for the agent. It follows that action (c) keeps the partition Exact1 for the first agent, as
claimed.
Now, consider Step 4. Since each knife never moves by more than one position at a time,
unless the algorithm terminates beforehand, this step will eventually be reached. Suppose that
the first knife has arrived at the initial position of the second knife, but the second knife is not
yet at the initial position of the first knife. The current partition is Exact1 for the first agent.
Also, if the second knife moves clockwise to the initial position of the first knife, again we have
an Exact1 partition for the agent. Hence, monotonicity of the EF1 property implies that every
partition in between is also Exact1 for the agent.
Finally, we show that the algorithm necessarily terminates. Suppose that this is not the
case. Assume that in the initial partition with parts M1 and M2, the second agent believes that
M2 is not EF1. This means that u2(M2) < u2(M1\{j}) for any j at the end of block M1. In
one iteration of Step 3 or 4, M1 loses at most one end item to M2—call this item j
′ (if M1 does
not lose any item, take j′ to be an arbitrary end item in M1), and the respective parts of the
partition after the iteration O1 and O2. Since u2(M1\{j
′}) > u2(M2) = u2((M2∪{j′})\{j′}), we
have that O1 is also EF1 for the second agent. However, since the algorithm does not terminate
here by assumption, O2 is not EF1 for the second agent. The same argument tells us that in
further iterations, the second bundle (i.e., M2, O2, and so on) is still not EF1 for the agent.
However, the algorithm must reach a point where the first knife is at the initial position of the
second knife and, at the same time, the second knife is also at the initial position of the first
knife. At this point, the second bundle coincides with the initial first bundle, so it must be EF1
for the second agent. This yields the desired contradiction.
Regarding the running time, note that each knife moves clockwise around the circle only
once, so the number of partitions considered by the algorithm is linear. For each partition,
checking the relevant Exact1 condition can be done in constant time since it involves hypothet-
ically removing only a constant number of items. Hence the algorithm runs in linear time, as
claimed.
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A.2 Continuous Extensions
The discrete consensus halving problem allows us to concern ourselves exclusively with the
agents’ utilities for non-fractional sets of items, which are represented by set functions. For an
additive set function, there exists an obvious extension to fractional sets of items: the linear
extension used in Section 2. This is, however, not the case for general monotonic functions. In
this subsection, we address two extensions that have been studied in the literature, namely the
Lova´sz extension and the multilinear extension. We refer to the lecture notes of Vondra´k [2010]
for further discussion of these extensions.
Let x = (x1, . . . , xm), and for each subset S ⊆ [m], denote by 1S the vector of length m
such that the ith component is 1 if i ∈ S, and 0 otherwise.
Definition A.5. Given a function f : {0, 1}m → R, the Lova´sz extension fL : [0, 1]m → R of f
is defined by
fL(x) =
m∑
i=0
λif(Si),
where ∅ = S0 ⊂ S1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sm = [m] is a chain such that
∑m
i=0 λi1Si = x for λ0, λ1, . . . , λm ≥ 0
with
∑m
i=0 λi = 1.
As an example, suppose that m = 3 and x = (1, 0.1, 0.3). Then we have S1 = {1}, S2 = {1, 3},
S3 = {1, 2, 3}, and (λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3) = (0, 0.7, 0.2, 0.1), meaning that
fL(x) = 0.7 · f({1}) + 0.2 · f({1, 3}) + 0.1 · f({1, 2, 3}).
Definition A.6. Given a function f : {0, 1}m → R, the multilinear extension F : [0, 1]m → R
of f is defined by
F (x) =
∑
S⊆[m]
f(S)
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i∈[m]\S
(1− xi).
For the example above, we have
F (x) = 0.9 · 0.7 · f({1}) + 0.1 · 0.7 · f({1, 2}) + 0.9 · 0.3 · f({1, 3}) + 0.1 · 0.3 · f({1, 2, 3})
= 0.63 · f({1}) + 0.07 · f({1, 2}) + 0.27 · f({1, 3}) + 0.03 · f({1, 2, 3}).
Vondra´k [2010] proved that if f is a monotonic set function, then its multilinear extension
F is also monotonic, i.e., increasing a component xi by any amount does not decrease the value
of the function F (x). For completeness, we show an analogous result for the Lova´sz extension.
Proposition A.7. If a function f : {0, 1}m → R is monotonic, then so is its Lova´sz extension
fL.
Proof. Let f be a monotonic set function, and fL be its Lova´sz extension. Let x ∈ [0, 1]m, and
assume that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xm (other orderings can be handled analogously). In this case, we
have
fL(x) = x1f({1, 2, . . . ,m}) + (x2 − x1)f({2, 3, . . . ,m}) + . . .
+ (xi − xi−1)f({i, . . . ,m}) + (xi+1 − xi)f({i+ 1, . . . ,m}) + . . .
+ (xm − xm−1)f({m}).
It suffices to show that for any i, the value fL(x) does not decrease upon increasing xi. This
is obvious if i = m. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, we only need to prove that fL(x) does not decrease
when we increase xi until it reaches xi+1—indeed, if we want to increase xi further, we can
26
swap the roles of xi and xi+1 and apply the same argument. When we increase xi in the range
[xi−1, xi+1], the only terms that change are xi · f({i, . . . ,m}) and −xi · f({i+ 1, . . . ,m}). The
net change is
xi · (f({i, . . . ,m})− f({i+ 1, . . . ,m})),
which is nonnegative due to the monotonicity of f . The conclusion follows.
When n is constant, computing a consensus halving for a utility function given by the Lova´sz
extension of a monotonic set function can be done efficiently.
Theorem A.8. For a constant number of agents with monotonic utilities, each given by the
Lova´sz extension of a set function, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a
consensus halving with at most min{n,m} cuts (assuming access to a utility oracle for the set
function).
Proof. If n ≥ m, we can simply divide every item in half, so assume that n ≤ m. Arrange
the items on a line in arbitrary order. Similarly to the proof of Theorem A.2, there exists a
consensus halving that uses at most n cuts on the line such that for any pair of consecutive cut
items, the block of whole items in between either all belong to M1 or all belong to M2. We
will perform a brute-force search over all partitions of items into (M0,M1,M2) such that all cut
items belong to M0 and the above property is satisfied; as in Theorem A.2, this search takes
polynomial time.
For each such partition, it remains to determine the ratios by which we should divide the
items in M0 between M1 and M2. Denote by x1, . . . , xr the fraction of the r ≤ n items in M0
that should go into M1. We iterate over all possible orderings of x1, . . . , xr—there are at most
n! orderings, which is polynomial since n is constant. For each ordering, one can verify that the
consensus-halving condition for each agent reduces to a linear equation in x1, . . . , xr. Hence,
to check the feasibility of a partition along with an ordering, we can run any efficient linear
programming algorithm (with an arbitrary objective) on the ordering and consensus-halving
constraints. The previous paragraph implies that at least one combination of partition and
ordering results in a feasible linear program, which in turn gives rise to the desired consensus
halving.
A consequence of Theorem A.8 is that for the Lova´sz extension, if the set function is rational,
then there exists a consensus halving with rational ratios. By contrast, for the multilinear
extension, a consensus halving may necessarily involve splitting items in irrational ratios, even
if the set function only takes on integer values.
Theorem A.9. There exists an instance with n = 2 and m = 3 in which each agent has
a monotonic utility function given by the multilinear extension of a set function taking on
integer values, but every consensus halving with at most two cuts involves splitting some items
in irrational ratios.
Proof. Assume that n = 2 and m = 3. The utility functions of the agents are given in Table 1.
Notice that the function of the second agent is the same as that of the first agent, except with
the roles of items 2 and 3 reversed.
Consider a consensus halving (M1,M2) of this instance with at most two cuts. Since u1(2) >
u1({1, 3}), item 2 needs to be cut. Similarly, since u2(3) > u2({1, 2}), item 3 needs to be cut.
Hence item 1 must be uncut; assume without loss of generality that it belongs to M1. Let x2
and x3 be the fraction of item 2 and 3 in M1, respectively. Since u1(M1) = u1(M2), we have
(1− x2)(1 − x3) · u1(1) + x2(1− x3) · u1({1, 2}) + x3(1− x2) · u1({1, 3}) + x2x3 · u1({1, 2, 3})
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Set S u1(S) u2(S)
∅ 0 0
{1} 1 1
{2} 10 2
{3} 2 10
{1, 2} 12 3
{1, 3} 3 12
{2, 3} 14 14
{1, 2, 3} 20 20
Table 1: Utility functions for the instance in the proof of Theorem A.9.
= x2x3 · u1(∅) + x3(1− x2) · u1(2) + x2(1− x3) · u1(3) + (1− x2)(1− x3) · u1({2, 3}).
This is equivalent to
(1− x2)(1− x3) · (−13) + x2(1− x3) · 10 + x3(1− x2) · (−7) + x2x3 · 20 = 0,
or
− 13 + 23x2 + 6x3 + 4x2x3 = 0. (5)
By symmetry, u2(M1) = u2(M2) implies that
− 13 + 23x3 + 6x2 + 4x2x3 = 0. (6)
Subtracting (6) from (5) yields 17x2 = 17x3, so x2 = x3. Plugging this back into (5), we get
4x22 + 29x2 − 13 = 0. (7)
The only positive solution to (7) is x2 =
√
1049−29
8 ≈ 0.4235 . . . , meaning that every consensus
halving involves splitting items 2 and 3 in irrational ratios.
Theorem A.9 implies that for the multilinear extension, computing a consensus halving
exactly may not be possible if our computation model only allows representing rational num-
bers. As we can see, with two agents and two necessary cuts, the problem already requires
solving a quadratic equation. For more agents, we can therefore expect that one would need
to solve higher-degree polynomial equations—the Abel-Ruffini theorem states that almost all
polynomials of degree at least five do not admit a solution in radicals. Hence, for this extension,
finding an approximate consensus halving is likely the best that one could do even under general
computational models.
B Proof of Lemma 3.4
We reduce from the ε-Gcircuit problem, which is known to be PPAD-hard even for some
constant ε > 0 [Rubinstein, 2018]. In this problem we are given a generalized circuit (V,T ),
where there are 9 gate types: Gζ , G×ζ , G=, G+, G−, G<, G∨, G∧ and G¬ with ζ ∈ [0, 1]
for the first two gates (see [Rubinstein, 2018] for a formal definition of the gates). The last
three gate types correspond to Boolean operations. As shown by Schuldenzucker and Seuken
[2019, Corollary 1], these three gate types are actually not necessary, and the problem remains
PPAD-hard for constant ε even without them. Apart from the set of gates, the other difference
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with ε-simple-Gcircuit is that in ε-Gcircuit we want to assign a number in [0, 1] to each
node (instead of [−1, 1]).
Let ε̂ > 0 be a constant such that the ε̂-Gcircuit problem without Boolean operation
gates is PPAD-hard, and let (V,T ) be an instance of ε̂-Gcircuit without Boolean gates. We
construct an instance (V ′,T ′) of ε-simple-Gcircuit, where ε > 0 is a sufficiently small constant
(which we pick later), such that any solution to the new instance yields a solution to the original
instance. We let V ′ = V ∪Vaux, where Vaux is a set of nodes that will be used for “intermediate”
results when simulating the gates of the original problem with the restricted set of gates allowed
in ε-simple-Gcircuit. We will construct T ′ such that it induces the original constraints of T
on the nodes V ⊂ V ′. Furthermore, we will also ensure that in any solution x : V ′ → [−1, 1], we
have x[v] ∈ [0, 1] for all v ∈ V ⊂ V ′. Thus, restricting x to V will immediately yield a solution
to the original ε̂-Gcircuit instance.
Recall that we only have three types of gates at our disposal: G+, G×−|ζ| for ζ ∈ (0, 1], and
G1. We begin by constructing some useful gadgets that simulate more operations on the same
domain [−1, 1]. Throughout, we denote the input nodes by u1, u2 (if applicable) and the output
node by v.
G×ζ : multiplication by ζ ∈ [−1, 1]. This gadget ensures that x[v] = ζ · x[u1]± 2ε. If ζ < 0,
use a G×−|ζ| gate with input u1 and output v. If ζ > 0, use a G×−|ζ| gate with input u1
and output w ∈ Vaux, and then a G×−|1| gate with input w and output v, which ensures that
x[v] = ζ ·x[u1]±2ε. Finally, if ζ = 0, then use a G×−|1| gate with input u1 and output w ∈ Vaux,
and then a G+ gate with inputs u1, w and output v. This ensures that x[v] = 0± 2ε.
Gζ : constant ζ ∈ [−1, 1]. This gadget ensures that x[v] = ζ ± 3ε. We use a G1 gate with
output w ∈ Vaux, and then a G×ζ gadget with input w and output v, which yields the desired
result.
G×2: multiplication by 2. This gadget ensures that x[v] = T[−1,1](2x[u1]) ± 3ε. We use a
G×1 gadget with input u1 and output w ∈ Vaux, and then a G+ gate with inputs u1, w and
output v, which yields the desired result.
Before we show how to construct gadgets that simulate the gates of ε̂-Gcircuit, we need a
way to ensure that for v ∈ V ⊂ V ′, we have x[v] ∈ [0, 1]. To achieve this we will make extensive
use of the following gadget.
G[0,1]: truncation to [0, 1]. This gadget ensures that x[v] ∈ [0, 1] and x[v] = T[0,1](x[u1])±16ε.
To achieve this we use the fact that for any t ∈ [−1, 1], it holds that T[0,1](t) = T[−1,1][t+(−1)]+1.
First, we use a G−1 gadget with output w1 ∈ Vaux, and then a G+ gate with inputs u1, w1
and output w2 ∈ Vaux. Next, we use a G1 gate with output w3 ∈ Vaux, and then a G+
gate with inputs w2, w3 and output w4 ∈ Vaux. Since, the G−1 gadget has error at most 3ε
and the G+ and G1 gates have error at most ε, we obtain that x[w4] = T[0,1](x[u1]) ± 6ε.
Furthermore, it holds that x[w4] ≥ −2ε, since x[w4] = T[−1,1](x[w2]+x[w3])± ε, x[w2] ∈ [−1, 1]
and x[w3] ≥ 1 − ε. Finally, we also use a G6ε gadget with output w5 ∈ Vaux, and a G+ gate
with inputs w4, w5 and output v. This introduces an additional error of at most 4ε and thus
ensures that x[v] = T[−1,1](T[0,1](x[u1]) + 6ε) ± 10ε = T[0,1](x[u1]) ± 16ε. Furthermore, it also
holds that x[v] ≥ T[−1,1](x[w4] + x[w5])− ε ≥ 0, since x[w4] ≥ −2ε and x[w5] ≥ 6ε− 3ε.
We are now ready to simulate the constraints T of the original instance on the nodes V ⊂ V ′.
First of all, for any node v ∈ V that does not appear as the output of any gate in T , we ensure
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that x[v] ∈ [0, 1] as follows: create a node w ∈ Vaux and use a G[0,1] gadget with input w and
output v. Note that we do not care about the error in this case, since we only want to ensure
that x[v] ∈ [0, 1]. For all v ∈ V that appear as the output of some gate in T , the gadget that
outputs into v will ensure that x[v] ∈ [0, 1].
For every gate T = (G,u1, u2, v, ζ) ∈ T , we ensure that the corresponding constraint holds
as follows:
(G
[0,1]
ζ , nil, nil, v, ζ): constant ζ ∈ [0, 1]. This gadget ensures that x[v] ∈ [0, 1] and x[v] =
ζ ± 19ε. We use a Gζ gadget with output w ∈ Vaux, and then a G[0,1] gadget with input w and
output v.
(G
[0,1]
×ζ , u1, nil, v, ζ): multiplication by ζ ∈ [0, 1]. This gadget ensures that x[v] ∈ [0, 1] and
x[v] = T[0,1](ζ · x[u1]) ± 18ε. We use a G×ζ gadget with input u1 and output w ∈ Vaux, and
then a G[0,1] gadget with input w and output v.
(G
[0,1]
= , u1, nil, v, nil): copy. This gadget ensures that x[v] ∈ [0, 1] and x[v] = T[0,1](x[u1]) ±
16ε. For this we simply use the G[0,1] gadget with input u1 and output v.
(G
[0,1]
+ , u1, u2, v, nil): addition. This gadget ensures that x[v] ∈ [0, 1] and x[v] = T[0,1](x[u1]+
x[u2])±17ε. We use a G+ gate with inputs u1, u2 and output w ∈ Vaux, and then a G[0,1] gadget
with input w and output v.
(G
[0,1]
− , u1, u2, v, nil): subtraction. This gadget ensures that x[v] ∈ [0, 1] and x[v] = T[0,1](x[u1]−
x[u2]) ± 18ε. We use a G×−|1| gate with input u2 and output w1 ∈ Vaux, then a G+ gate with
inputs u1, w1 and output w2 ∈ Vaux, and finally a G[0,1] gadget with input w2 and output v.
(G
[0,1]
< , u1, u2, v, nil): comparison. This gate ensures that x[v] ∈ [0, 1] and
• if x[u1] < x[u2]− ε̂, then x[v] = 1± 19ε,
• if x[u1] > x[u2] + ε̂, then x[v] = 0± 19ε.
We use a G×−|1| gate with input u1 and output w ∈ Vaux, and then a G+ gate with inputs
u2, w and output w0 ∈ Vaux. This ensures that x[w0] = T[−1,1](x[u2] − x[u1]) ± 2ε. Let k =
⌈log2(1/ε̂)⌉+1, so 2/ε̂ ≤ 2
k ≤ 4/ε̂. Next, for i ∈ [k], we use a G×2 gadget with input wi−1 and
output wi ∈ Vaux. Finally, we use a G[0,1] gadget with input wk and output v.
For the analysis, we first consider the case x[u1] < x[u2] − ε̂. Then, it holds that x[w0] ≥
ε̂ − 2ε ≥ ε̂ − 3ε. First, let us show by contradiction that there must exist i ∈ [k] such that
x[wi] < 2x[wi−1]−3ε. Assume that for all i ∈ [k] we have x[wi] ≥ 2x[wi−1]−3ε. Then it follows
that x[wk] ≥ 2
k ε̂− 3ε
∑k
i=0 2
i ≥ 2kε̂− 3ε2k+1 ≥ 2ε̂/ε̂ − 3ε · 8/ε̂ = 2− 24ε/ε̂. If we ensure that
ε < ε̂/24, then we obtain that x[wk] > 1, which is impossible. Thus, let i ∈ [k] be such that
x[wi] < 2x[wi−1]− 3ε. Recall that the G×2 gadget ensures that x[wi] ≥ T[−1,1](2x[wi−1])− 3ε.
Thus, it must be that T[−1,1](2x[wi−1]) < 2x[wi−1], i.e., 2x[wi−1] ≥ 1. This implies that
x[wi] ≥ 1− 3ε and thus x[wi+1] ≥ T[−1,1](2 − 6ε) − 3ε ≥ 1− 3ε, if we ensure that ε ≤ 1/6. By
induction, it follows that x[wk] ≥ 1− 3ε and thus x[v] ≥ 1− 19ε, as desired.
Now, consider the case x[u1] > x[u2]+ ε̂. By an analogous argument, we obtain that it must
be that x[wk] ≤ −1 + 3ε, and thus x[v] = T[0,1](x[wk])± 16ε = 0± 19ε.
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We can now finish the reduction. We set ε = ε̂/25. This ensures that all the assumptions
we have made about ε hold, and that all the gadgets that simulate the gates in T have error at
most ε̂.
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